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CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO LAND USE PLANNING AND REGULATION:
A TENTATIVE RESTATEMENT*
NORMAN WENGERT**

Five major land use cases dealing with constitutional questions
were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1920's.' For 46
years, from 1927 to 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court was silent on land
use issues, although numerous constitutional decisions on other
topics in that period have considerable significance for land use planning and control.
The collapse of the real estate boom in 1927 and the near halt to
development, which lasted virtually to the end of World War II contributed to the absence of constitutional issues. But two other factors were perhaps more important. First, the Court was obviously
reluctant to get involved in land use planning and control cases,
deferring to state courts in this field. Second, the character of the
early decisions established fundamental constitutional guidelines for
state courts to follow and thus supported subsequent denials of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to new cases.
From 1974 to mid-1977 the U.S. Supreme Court, still reluctant,
has considered seven land use cases. 2 But the general stance of the
*The research for this article was supported by the Colorado State University Experiment
Station. Responsibility for the content of this article is that of the author.
**Member, Wisconsin Bar; Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University, Fort
Collins, Colorado 80523.
1. The five cases were:
a. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
b. Zahn v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 274 U.S. 325
(1927);
c. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927);
d. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928);
e. Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
A tremendously important sixth case of this era should also be listed since it has been
most important in the development of the "Taking Issue": Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. These seven cases were:
a. Village of Belie Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974);
b. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
c. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976);
d. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 426 U.S. 668 (1976);
e. Young v. American Mini-theater, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976);
L Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Redevelopment Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977);
g. Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
-U.S.
, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
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federal courts, including the Supreme Court, continues to be to avoid
land use planning and control litigation.3
The states, on the other hand, have had neither the option of
avoiding nor apparently the desire to minimize land use planning and
control litigation. According to Norman Williams in his treatise
American Land Planning Law,4 the states have in about 50 years
produced over 10,000 reported opinions dealing with land use controls. Seventy-five percent of these cases have arisen in 13 states,'
primarily those which experienced most urban growth since the midtwenties. Not all, but a substantial number of the cases have included
constitutional challenges, often based on the allegation that exercise
of the police power by local government involved a taking of property without compensation.
This tremendous volume of cases suggests two observations. First,
land use control has not been readily accepted by many parties in
interest. Second, the state courts have not been able to decide cases
in such a manner as to establish principles that might have obviated
subsequent challenges.
So many Americans, including George Washington and Benjamin
Franklin, have established family fortunes on the basis of unearned
increments and windfall profits gained from appreciation and the
development and sale of real estate, that many others have the strong
desire to repeat this experience. Thus, it is not surprising that landowners will fight any public actions that are perceived as diminishing
opportunities and expectations for profits.
It has been said that we have regarded land as a commodity rather
than as a resource for too long. Giving distinctive labels hardly solves
the basic problems of profit expectation, however. Greed, which so
often energizes our economic processes, is not exorcised by recognizing it as one of the seven deadly sins. If there is a chance of
defeating the application of land use controls which appear to
threaten profit potential, that chance will often appear to be worth
taking, whatever the public interest may be.
Nevertheless, for all of the 10,000 reported land use cases, there
are probably thousands more situations where controls have been
3. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL COMMENT (August 1976);
THE COURTS AND LAND USE, and THE COURTS AND LAND USE 11 (1977). Brief
summaries of the cases listed, supra notes I and 2, appear on pp. 6 and 7 of the August
1977 issue.
4. N. WILLIAMS, 1 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE
POLICE POWER 81 (1975).
5. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Florida, Texas and California. Id.
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accepted and complied with. The controls may not have been foresighted: many urban areas have been plagued with strip cities, sprawl,
exclusionary controls, and many other evils. But the fact is that our
system has provided housing for 70 million people added to our
population from 1950 to 1978, plus housing for the millions who
relocated. This achievement is significant even though hindsight tells
us we could have done better, we could have been fairer, and we
could have built fewer ugly developments.
Professional planners, planning commissions, and those who follow their advice-as well as those who are concerned with America
the ugly and shabby-tend to stress problem solving. In so doing,
they reflect a liberal or progovernmental tradition as well as dominant planning values. It is, then, but a short step to regarding the
trilogy "life, liberty and property" as rationalizations of selfish interests of ruling elites.
. This deterministic interpretation of history, common at least since
Charles A. Beard wrote An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution,6 may minimize the extent to which property in fact provided an important foundation for civil liberties. At various times
when the rights of Englishmen were being established in the British
Constitution, it was men of property who were able to stand up to
and resist the arbitrary and capricious actions of the several autocratic monarchs from Runnymeade to the American Revolution. As
the Declaration of Independence declares, the signers laid life, liberty
and property on the line.
In any case, those who advocate land use controls today are often
less interested in individual property rights than in achieving more
attractive land use. Thus, while conflict between individual interests
and public interests is a frequent element in attempts to control land
use, regulation to achieve social benefits (without too much concern
for identifying those on whom the cost burdens may fall) has seemed
an inexpensive method of proceeding. Land use planning has been
premised on concepts of public good, but it has not been characterized by rigorous benefit-cost analyses nor by a concern for distributive questions of who benefits and who pays. Once the requirement that zoning be "in accordance with the comprehensive plan"
was watered down,7 those plans designated as "comprehensive"
6. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913).
'7. The Model Planning Law, recommended in the late 1920's by the U.S. Department of
Commerce and adopted by most states, specified that zoning was to be "in accordance with
the master plan." But courts did not insist on this logical relationship, accepting zoning
actions as equivalent to or substitutes for the master plan. For a discussion of this situation
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tended at best to be attractive, even if unreal, goal statements, rather
than rigorous analyses of community needs and potentials. At worst,
they were simply the sum of many ad hoc zoning decisions often
accommodating development interests rather than spelling out
community needs.8 In the process property rights were considered
important only as they provided a basis for potential litigation. Perhaps the attitude is reflected in the description of property rights as a
bundle of sticks into which the "right to develop" is inserted by
government action, rather than being inherent in fee simple ownership.9
EXPANSION OF LAND USE REGULATION

Whatever view one might hold with respect to the desirability of
land use planning and control, it is safe to predict that the extent of
public intervention will continue to increase and become more comprehensive. The 10,000 cases referred to by Norman Williams indicate that the dominant thrust of court decisions will be to sustain
such intervention. On occasion particular regulations will be ruled
ultra vires, or classified as "taking property without just compensation." Some government actions, in addition, may be considered
inverse condemnations, and compensation will be required. Direct
pressure toward more land use regulation will be exerted through
zoning, subdivision controls, recent innovative techniques, and
see Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955). Only
in very recent cases have courts in a few states begun to insist on zoning decisions being
consistent with the comprehensive plan. For a brief summary of early developments see D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, Chs. 2
and 4 (1971). For reference to developing trends see D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING
AND CONTROL OF URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT, Ch. 8 (1973).
8. Thus Professor Haax writes, Id. at 1173, "... the courts have taken a number of
different approaches in testing zoning measures for consonance with the enabling act mandate of 'accordance with a comprehensive plan.' .. . But all of them share a common defect:
they emphasize the question whether the zoning ordinance is a comprehensive plan, not
"
whether it is in accordance with a comprehensive plan ..
9. The "bundle of sticks" illustration of the diversity and severability of the various
property rights is much overworked. But little attention has been devoted to the fundamental question of whether after feudal dues were abolished and fee simple ownership
became dominant the bundle was full or only partially full. While one can cite Locke,
Bentham, and even Blackstone to the effect that property rights are a product of society
and of its laws, this tells us little or nothing as to whether the fee simple owner starts with
all rights, and removing any one by societal or governmental non-voluntary action is a
taking; or whether some rights such as the right to develop a particular environmentally
sensitive tract is a privilege bestowed on the fee simple owner: an addition to his bundle of
sticks. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.
2d 761 (1972), suggested the privilege argument, but in so doing denied both historical
practice and judicial precedent. See discussion of this case, infra, at note 46.
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indirect pressure through air and water pollution control and environmental management.
That regulatory evolution of land use control will continue is a
major premise of this article. Does this mean that a concern for
individual property rights is, therefore, useless and irrelevant? Not at
all. It means, rather, that we must reexamine the constitutional issues
involved and the way in which they are raised and analyzed. Individual rights, including property rights, are still of tremendous importance to American liberty and democracy. But we must ask how
best these rights may be protected. The second premise of this article
is that in land use litigation we have been asking the wrong questions,
focusing on the wrong issues, and seeking too often simply to
frustrate government's legitimate responsibility for land use planning
to achieve an improved quality of life (i.e., the general welfare).
THE SEPARATE PATHS OF LEGAL DOCTRINES
A difficulty in applying constitutional doctrines to land use planning and control litigation arises from the fragmentation and compartmentalization of relevant thought on the subject. Practicing
lawyers concerned with protecting clients' interests from the adverse
effects of regulation and public attorneys defending regulation
against constitutional challenge (or preparing ordinances that will
minimize potential challenges) are highly specialized, but primarily
interested in specific situations and particular appellate decisions
which support their views of the law. Judges handling trials or appeals generally have little time to go beyond what the attorneys for
the parties present. Paraphrasing, one might say that far too many
opinions are "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd, bound in"' 0 by limited
concepts and jurisprudential theories. Much of the rich jurisprudential and philosophic literature exploring concepts of property
and property rights is the result of academics writing for academics,
for there seems little evidence of much direct influence on day-today dealing with land use regulation issues.
Far more influential have been the polemics of the hustings, that
when supporting regulation, are premised on values associated with
the "city beautiful," and when attacking regulation are premised on
Blackstone or the rhetoric of the John Birch Society. Neither of
these premises nor the arguments resting on them contribute much
to the formulation of Twentieth Century concepts of property, its
obligations, and appropriate control policies, nor to clarifying state/
citizen relationships in the land use field.
10. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act III, Scene Four.
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Forty years ago Professor Francis S. Philbrick wrote:
Manifestly we need a modernized philosophy of property.... The
first tenet of an adequate philosophy must be that property is the
creature and dependent of law, including, of course, our constitutions.... [P] rivate property, though admitting that it can exist only
by virtue of public protection, pleads payment of taxes as the whole
price of that protection, and beyond that claims immunity from all
social obligations. 1 1
Writing almost thirty years later in 1965 Dean John E. Cribbet said:
"We still need a modernized philosophy of property."' ' 2 In discussing the duties and privileges of feudal land relationships, he quoted

Professor Philbrick to the effect that it is regretable that there could
not have been preserved the idea that all property was held subject to

the performance of duties, not a few of them public, and concludes
"It may be that the wrong concepts of feudalism survived. .

.". ,

SHIBBOLETHS

The "taking issue" has been overstressed as a basis for halting the
application of land use controls to particular parcels or tracts. This

emphasis represents a meat-ax approach in a situation calling for a
scalpel. Bosselman and associates' 4 should certainly have under11. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U.PA. L. REV. 691, 728
(1938).
12. Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the Law of Land Use, 50 IOWA L. REV. 245, 246.
13. Id. at 247. From more than casual contact it has seemed to me that Continental law,
specifically German law, by drawing more on the jurisprudential writings of legal scholars
has been better able to adapt to changing social situations and needs. See Wengert, Land Use
Planningand Control in the German FederalRepublic, 15 NAT. RES. J. 511 (1975).
14. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973). This monograph
argues convincingly that regulation of the uses of property, though not frequent, were
accepted as proper exercises of government police power authority throughout the 19th
Century. It also shows that the doctrine that regulation, if too severe, could become a taking
was formulated primarily by Justice Holmes, first as a Justice on the high court of Massachusetts and then in his opinion in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In the latter opinion Justice Holmes suggested that
the public benefits sought had to be balanced against the private economic costs suffered by
the land owner, and that if the costs were too great, then the diminishment in value was a
taking of property and required compensation. He stated "If regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking ....
This is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed
of by general propositions." Id. at 415-16. One result of this decision was thus to require
case-by-case assessment of the impact of each land use regulation on each individual piece of
property-a result which no doubt in part accounts for the tremendous volume of land use
litigation on the taking issue in the state courts. Subsequent to the Pennsylvania Coal
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained zoning as a proper exercise of the police power,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Euclid decision, however,
reinforced the case-by-case balancing established by Justice Holmes as the test of whether a

January 1979]

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO LAND USE

7

mined the belief that the Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon' I
decision had its roots in Magna Charta; they showed, instead, the
Holmesian origins of this doctrine which has dominated challenges to
zoning and other land use controls. But traditional modes of thought
persist and the "taking issue" as formulated by Holmes remains a
significant weapon for attacking land use controls in most state
courts.
We need also to reexamine the assumption that "just price" means
market price defined in terms of maximum hypothetical use expectations. Valuation is not a black art. The literature on the subject as it
relates to taxation, as it relates to estates, or to utility capitalization
and rate setting is extensive, but it seems not to have had much
influence on definitions of "just price" in challenges to land use
regulations. In analogous situations the German Constitutional Court
rejected market price as a basis for determining what the public owed
a landowner, stressing the fact that much of the market price was a
result of social action and asserting that it hardly seemed fair to have
society pay for values it created. 1 6 If a market is going to be
hypothesized, ought not "caveat emptor" enter into the valuation
situation at some point?1 7 How should the trade-offs of windfalls
for wipeouts be dealt with? Do we really believe that there is an
unqualified "right" to unearned increments?1 8
Individual rights will be better protected by stressing substantive
in addition to procedural due process. At the same time, it will be
necessary to get rid of sterile and counterproductive applications of
separation of powers doctrines to local land use regulations. The
classification of local land use regulations as "legislative" due the
''presumption of validity" traditionally accorded by the judicial
branch to actions of legislation is a fiction contrary to fact. More
taking had occurred. The study by Bosselman and associates may over time contribute to a
narrowing, if not to a complete redefinition of the taking issue. But presently, allegations of
taking remain the major basis for attacking land use controls.
15. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
16. Wengert, supra note 13, at 523.
17. A case that might have come out differently if "caveat emptor" had been applied is
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193
A.2d 232 (1963). The buyer of swampland, it should be argued, assumes the risk that it may
have no uses except as swamp land. It might also be argued (really a question of fact) that
the investment required to reclaim the swampland would have brought a substantial return
in some other venture, i.e., the value of swampland is a function of improvement efforts and
expenditures and rarely inheres in the land as such. Moreover, how could a regulation take
what is not yet there, that is, development?
18. The equities in land use control situations are creatively explored in D. HAGMAN &
D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978).
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importantly, deference to something arbitrarily called legislative
action avoids consideration of "essential fairness" in governmental
processes and forecloses an examination of the rational connection
between the action taken and the situation dealt with. It thus minimizes the importance of a factual record as the basis for action and
precludes a testing of action by ordinary standards of logic. Even
where policy choices are necessary, the fact of choice does not convert action to legislation any more than choosing "A" instead of "B"
as an employee is legislative in character.
In virtually all cases, it should be possible to show alternatives
considered, their relationships and possible consequences, and then
to explain the policy choice made in terms of impact on and relationship to specifically described public interests. The phrases here
listed-alternatives, consequences, impact-are those of NEPA and
suggest the possible importance of NEPA concepts for land planning
and control.' 9
LESSONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis defines administrative law as "the
Law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing judicial review of administrative action." The scope of administrative action, in his view,
includes actions that affect "the rights of private parties through
either adjudication, rule making, investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or informally acting." He states that "when the President, or a governor, or a municipal governing body, exercises powers
of adjudication or rule making, he or it is to that extent an administrative agency." Administrative law is not limited to the regulatory
agencies, but embraces all governmental machinery for carrying out
governmental programs. But unlike European administrative law,
American administrative law tends to concentrate on powers,
authority, procedures, and judicial review. 2" The argument of this
paper is that land use regulations (i.e., zoning, subdivision control,
etc.) involve the exercise of substantial administrative discretion and
for this reason the devloping principles of administrative law take on
particular significance. 2 '
The administrative process includes both adjudication and rule
making, the two aspects of the process often being intricately inter-

19. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1976).
20. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 1 (3d ed. 1972).
21. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971).
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woven. Thus basic questions with respect to fairness apply to
both." 2
The problem in administrative action, Davis argues, is to assure a
reasonable exercise of needed discretionary power. The important
question, also in land use regulation, is how the exercise of discretionary power might be limited by means of procedural safeguards to
provide for "essential fairness." Two subsidiary questions are relevant. One is a traditional question, namely: "When is discretion arbitrary and capricious?" The other, and one which is only rarely
raised, is: "When is discretionary action not reasonably related to the
facts with which it is supposed to deal and upon which it is supposed
to be based?" Answers to both questions involve exercises in rigorous
logic applied to specific facts. Where scientific facts and data are
available or can be secured to support particular decisions, simple
declarations or generalized findings of facts (even when labeled legislative) should not be allowed to suffice as a basis for restriction of
individual rights. There still are many areas of administrative regulation in which judgment must be the basis for action but facts are
ascertainable, and the law should require that these facts be set forth
and that actions taken represent logically tenable conclusions from
the facts.
Policies and programs may be arbitrary and capricious simply because they have not adequately taken consequences into account or
have not involved careful considerations of alternative ways to
achieve particular ends. This, of course, is the emphasis of NEPA:
factual
assessment of consequences and alternatives based upon
2
analysis as set forth in environmental impact statements. 3
In land use regulation courts often accept such vague declarations
as "just and reasonable," "public interest," "public convenience, interest or necessity," or other equally meaningless generalizations suggesting that these findings provide adequate statutory standards.
Clearly, delegations based on vague and meaningless phrases are not
much different from delegations without standards.
Davis suggests that state legislatures are less responsible than Congress, particularly in the closing hours of a session. 2 ' Thus, clarification of legislative intent is often slipshod, and safeguards protecting
against arbitrary action are generally less developed. Few states maintain adequate legislative records so statutory construction is usually
limited to application of the "plain meaning" rule. And safeguards
22. DAVIS, supra note 20, at 11, § 1.05.
23. 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1976).
24. DAVIS, supra note 20, at 37, §2.06.
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against arbitrary action are absent, while requirements for stated
administrative standards are often ritualistic.
State courts have struck down a large number of legislative delegations to state administrative agencies, but it is noteworthy that
delegations to local governments have rarely been challenged. Local
governments exercising delegated powers, such as those involved in
land use regulation and control, can be every bit as arbitrary and
capricious as state agencies implementing a variety of state programs.
This lack of attention to delegations to local governments has historical political explanations, but has very little logic behind it. As
pointed out above, most state courts have been only too willing to
defer to the judgments of city councils and county commissions by
classifying their actions as legislative. The argument that since these
are elected bodies, their function must be legislative is only partially
valid since many state commissions and even department heads are
also elected. The test, if it has any relevance, should be functional,
with "essential fairness" as the desired goal. In any case, protection
against arbitrariness does not lie in statutory standards alone but in
procedural safeguards.
Davis stresses that what is needed is a consideration of both safeguards and standards in order to determine whether the total protection against arbitrary power is adequate. 2 s A power to make rules is
far more dangerous than a power to make rules after following procedures with party participation like those required by the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act.2 6 Even when the procedure is wholly
informal, and even when the action is directed to a single party, the
differences between fair procedure and lack of it should be assessed.
Because of inadequate judicial (or other) surveillance, administrative
action-including land use regulation-may be unguided by meaningful statutory standards, or even exercised in direct violation of legislative intent. Action is often unguided by administrative standards
and may be unprotected by administrative procedural safeguards.
Substantial authority may be delegated to subordinate officers with
little or no supervision, and immune to judicial review.
As an ideal for the administrative process, Davis emphasizes the
desirability of an open system, stressing that the crucial question is
not simply what the statute may say but what in fact administrators
do. In this regard the practice with respect to land use controls often
leaves much to be desired. As a corrective, Davis recommends establishing a system which: first, seeks to protect against unnecessary and
25. Id. at 41, §2.07.
26. 5 U.S.C. § §551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105 (1976), § §3344, 6362, 7562 (Supp. 1978).

January 1979]

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO LAND USE

11

uncontrolled discretionary power; second, focuses on safeguards
rather than on standards; third, requires administrators to develop
announced standards in advance of action; fourth, requires that officers with discretionary power do as much as feasible to structure
their discretion through published safeguards, and confine and guide
discretion through published standards, principles, and rules; fifth,
seeks not only to restrict undelegated power, but rather to stress the
dangers in selective enforcement. 2 7
The Administrative Procedure Act 2 8 and general traditions in
administrative law distinguish between quasi-legislative and quasijudicial action, or rule making and adjudication.2 9 By custom, courts
have been less likely to scrutinize the provisions of rules or rule
making processes except to determine that the rules are within the
scope of authority of the rule making agency and that they are not
artibrary and capricious. To fall under the strictures of "arbitrary
and capricious," rules and/or policy statements must by most tests
be so outrageous as to violate the sense of propriety of even the most
simple-minded citizen, or so contrary to fact as to be absurd.
The burden of proving that rules or policies are arbitrary and
capricious, moreover, falls on the aggrieved citizen, and often requires a showing of malice or evil intent. This appears superficially
logical, until one realizes that proof of evil or malicious intent requires investigatory power (and perhaps even subpoena power)
beyond the capacity of the ordinary citizen. One may know that
zoning decisions have been made by secret deals or are designed to
favor friends or injure political opponents, but proving such allegations may be most difficult. Facts as to conspiracy and collusion
between real estate developers, financial interests, and city council
members can rarely be proved by ordinary litigants in the absence of
open decisions, open procedures and open records tested by rigorous
logic.
While legislation or rule making may involve choices as to alternate
futures, one cannot escape the conclusion that policy at some point
must be based on facts or perceptions of fact. The rule making
process must, therefore, provide for correction of error by what
27. DAVIS, supra note 20, at 43, § 2.08.
28. 5 U.S.C. § §551-59 (1976). Professor Davis accepts this distinction but qualifies his
position considerably. See DAVIS, supra note 20, especially in Chs. 4-8, and An Approach
to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
29. See Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process
Before Land Use Regulation Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 50 (1974) which discusses
the position of the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'n., 264 Ore.
574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. U.S. called "the free trade
of ideas."'3
It is only in choosing among possible outcomes that the policy
maker exercises judgment. Here opportunity for argument and persuasion becomes important. But the logic of and reasons for the
choices made, as established in a written record, are important to an
assessment by others of "essential fairness" of the decision. Policies
deal with factual situations and thus the logical connection between
policies and stated conditions is subject to proof and logical display.
The focus of NEPA may usefully be kept in mind; NEPA recognizes
that alternatives may be important and that alternatives chosen have
consequences. Weighing of alternatives and assessment of consequences involve substantial fact questions subject to logical analysis
and proof. In a sense, there is a kind of continuum ranging from the
arbitrary and capricious policy, which simply springs from the beliefs
and prejudices of policy makers, to a careful assessment of a factual
record. The latter type of policy permits both a weighing of alternatives and a choice of the one that seems most effectively to accomplish goals sought, and that appears to have the most suitable
externality effects-environmental, economic, and social. 3 1
Land use controls must not be based simply on policy declarations
or assertions of findings that are not based upon investigation and
research. Most cities (all but the smallest) and many counties have
professional planning staffs who should be held responsible for building a logical record for rational action.
The comments of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Steel Hill
Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton3 2 suggest a proper concern for a factual basis for land use controls. The Court said:
We are disturbed by the admission here that there was never any

professional or scientific study made as to why six, rather than four
or eight, acres was reasonable to protect the values cherished by the

people of Sanbornton.... Hopefully, Sanbornton has begun or soon
will begin to plan with more precision for the future, taking advantage of numerous federal or state grants for which it might
qualify....

Another dimension of this problem of facts as the basis for decision concerns the issues of how and at what stage facts are to be
30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
31. See N. WENGERT, THE POLITICAL ALLOCATION OF BENEFITS AND BURDENS: ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES AND DUE PROCESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-

TECTION (1976).
32. 469 F.2d 956, 962 (1st. Cir. 1972).
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presented. When land use regulations are litigated, the factual situation was often not presented when the regulations were issued, or at
the trial, but in Brandeis-type briefs on appeal. While having data
presented by attorneys in appellate briefs may be better than having
no factual data, this approach may conflict with the basic value of
having facts presented as part of the trial subject to rebuttal and
cross examination. With respect to administrative bodies such as
planning commissions or city councils, the courts should insist that
factual data be introduced in the record at the time policy decisions
are made rather than by lawyers in appellate briefs. The snide footnote comments of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Construction
Industry Assn. of Sonoma County v. Petaluma3 3 may have been
justified if the court had at the same time insisted that the factual
material that the attorneys for the Contractors Association introduced in their brief be considered at the trial or earlier at an administrative hearing. What the Circuit Court failed to recognize, however,
was that the conclusion should have led to remand the case for lack
of factual studies by the regulating government.
Where regulations (rules) deal with detailed subject matter and
have specifically identifiable impacts, the regulating agency should
not be permitted to escape the requirement that "essential fairness"
demands rationalization and justification. It is just not enough to
simply label policies adopted as "legislative" and thus avoid the
issues of reasonableness because of traditional deference to legislative
decisions. Where courts conclude that facts do not seem to support
adopted policies, they must not substitute their own judgments on
sound policy, but should remand the matter to the regulatory body
for appropriate record enriching proceedings. The emphasis on building a record in the process of issuing rules and regulations as well as
in adjudication should include opportunity for opponents as well as
advocates to establish a record before litigation is contemplated.
Professor Davis recognizes that the agency has a responsibility to
weigh the evidence in rule making situations, but he also recognizes,
as does the Administrative Procedures Act, that any action taken
should be based upon the best available evidence. One might point
out that the stress in many recent statutes requiring citizen participation and recognizing the importance of research in the on-going
administrative process as a basis for policy making strengthens the
33. Construction Indus. Ass'n. of Sonoma County v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975) cert. den. 424 U.S. 934 n. 12: "Appellees' brief is unnecessarily oversize (125 pages)
mainly because it is rife with quotations from writers on regional planning, economic
regulation and sociological policies and themes. These types of considerations are more
appropriate for legislative bodies than for courts."
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views here expressed. The importance of examining the chain of logic
on which policy decisions or rules rest is crucial.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus3 4 the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the scientific expertise of the
Secretary of Agriculture, but found a flaw in the proceedings in that
the Secretary had not explained his decision. The court declared:
We stand on the threshold of a new era....
Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative
process itself will confine and control the exercise of [policy or rule
making] discretion. Courts should require administrative officers to

articulate standards and principles that govern their discretionary
decisions in as much detail as possible. Rules and regulations should
be freely formulated by administrators and revised when necessary
(footnotes omitted).
In remanding the case it seems apparent that the Court expected
testable statements of reasons and a clarification of standards, declaring that "the task of formulating standards must not be abandoned now," 3 s
LESSONS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
This subject has been alluded to in previous paragraphs. The discussion at this point, therefore, attempts a brief restatement of principles developed by the federal courts in NEPA litigation, 3 6 and then
suggests that an analogous approach would represent a substantial
step in achieving "essential fairness" in land use regulation. Moreover, this result might be achieved on the basis of constitutional "due
process" standards without new legislation.
First, the stress of NEPA on the consideration of alternatives and
consequences in assessing federal actions provides a clear mandate for
judicial review of agency actions. If, in its impact statement, an
agency presents three alternatives, the Courts have held that Congress
did not intend that two of the three should be false and weakly
developed: merely pro forma compliance with NEPA's requirements
is not sufficient. Alternatives must, rather, be explored in good faith
with equal degrees of detail and analytic rigor. Similarly, identification of consequences fo; each alternative must be thorough. The
rationale for the alternative chosen must be lucid and tenable, with a
clear record of the chain of reasoning behind the choice. Further34. 439 F.2d 584, 597, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
35. Id. at 597.
36. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1976).
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more, the issues of compliance with constitutional and statutory
standards posed by these statements must be testable on review in
court. Any other interpretation would simply depreciate the Congressional requirements to the level of preamble or vague policy,
instead of establishing a new procedural approach to decisions affecting the environment. 3

'

After some initial hesitancy, the federal courts had by 1972 begun
to stress the necessity of substantive review. Thus in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers (the Gilham Dam case) 3 8 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded:
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements
of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review
substantive agency decisions on the merits. Whether we look to common law or the Administrative Procedure Act, absent 'legislative
guidance as to reviewability, an administrative determination affecting legal rights is reviewable unless some special reason appears for
not reviewing (citation omitted).' In the case of NEPA the court
went on to say '. . . the prospect of substantive review should
improve the quality of agency decisions...

'Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first determine if
the agency reached its decision after full, good faith consideration

and balancing of environmental factors. The court must then determine ... whether the actual balance of costs and benefits that was

struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values' [NEPA, sections 101(b) and 102(1)] ... (citation
omitted).
In the Gilham Dam case the Circuit Court cited the Supreme Court
decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe3 as supportive of or analogous to its present decision. In Overton Park the
Supreme Court had spelled out the kind of record that the agency
must develop.4 0
In assessing the logical relation of the decision to the impact statement as a basis for remanding the
case for further agency action, a
41
Texas Federal District Court said:
37. For an elaboration of the views here summarized see E. DALGIN & T. GUILBERT
(eds.), FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238-419 (1974); R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL
POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1976).
38. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300 (8th Cit.
1972).
39. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
40. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972)
(decided two weeks after Gillham).
41. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1364 (S.D. Texas 1973);rev'don other
grounds, sub. noin. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Because the ... impact statement and the record ... indicate that

the balance struck was "arbitrary" and "clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental values" . . substantial in-depth revision by
the Corps in this area will be required prior to the acceptance of
either ..

impact statement.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in another 1972 case 4 2 commented on the utility of the impact statement: "[TIhe complete
formal impact statement represents an accessible means for opening
up the agency decision-making process and subjecting it to critical
evaluation.... [It] supplies a convenient record for the courts to use
in reviewing agency decisions on the merits ... [under] the substantive policies of NEPA."
A strong defense of substantive judicial review in environmental
law cases was presented more recently in a lecture by Judge James L.
Oakes (Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)
at a conference cosponsored by the Smithsonian Institution and the
Environmental Law Institute, February 10-12, 1977 in Washington,
D.C.
4
Judge Oakes said: 3
While broad delegations are nothing new in administrative law,
founded largely as it is on the concept of "public interest," they
take on special significance in the environmental [and I would add
land use as a segment of environment] context ....

Cases ... tend

to turn to a large extent on particular facts and on the attitudes of
those in power [the mission oriented agencies] , and the willingness
of those not in power [the interest groups] to fight for their views,
become more important than is perhaps healthy in a society that
prides itself on being governed by laws rather than men.
In environmental cases ... the courts have gone beyond traditional
procedural review. They have made extra certain that all information
is before the agency by broadly interpreting the case or controversy
clause to permit standing ... and by imposing procedural requirements not found in any statute, such as the cross-examination rights
accorded participants in a legislative type hearing (International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 3 ELR 20133 D.C. Cir.
1973). ... The courts have not hesitated to remand to agencies for
additional hearings and an extended record.... And, in the context
of environmental impact statements (EIS) under NEPA, the courts
have recognized the danger of pro forma agency compliance and
have insisted that the agency instead "take a hard look at the environmental consequences and alternatives."...
42. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972).
43. Judge Oakes' comments appeared in article form in 7 ENVIR. L. REP. 50,029

(1977).
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I do believe that a substantive judicial role is absolutely essential
if judges are to meet their serious constitutional obligation to check
abuses of executive discretion.
...

Judge Oakes referred to the discussion on this subject between two
of his colleagues in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA"4 and summarized the views
of Judge Leventhal to the effect that" s
... courts have an unavoidable responsibility, delegated to them by

Congress, to ensure that administrative actions remain within statutory limits and are not arbitrary and capricious and that conscientious judges can become sufficiently conversant in quite technical fields ... to make a determination of arbitrariness or rationality....

In the same opinion in which Judge Leventhal discussed this issue,
the majority opinion by Judge Skelly Wright emphasized that the
court must review "the evidence relied upon and the evidence discarded" as well as "questions addressed by the agency and those
bypassed."' 6 Finally, Judge Oakes concluded:4 I
If the EPA Administrator's substantive decision were allowed to
stand unchallenged, we would have much less assurance of its wisdom than we do in a system in which that decision is closely scrutinized for flaws by the interested parties and the Court of Appeals
and then, quite often, by the parties again in the Supreme Court....

[A] ware of what his decision must withstand, the Administrator will
make extra sure it is as wise as possible and will take care to articulate his reasoning in terms that make the decision as defensible as
possible.
The interest in the substance of administrative decisions is not
limited to environmental law cases under NEPA. In the landmark
case of Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel"8 Justice Hall of the New Jersey Supreme Court
stressed the court's concern for substantive due process (under the
New Jersey constitution). On the basis of this concern the court
proceeded to examine not only the procedure by which the Township of Mt. Laurel had adopted its master plan and zoning, but also
the consequences of these land use controls. Justice Hall explicitly
avoided speculating about the motives of the Township Board, but
44. 541 F.2d 1,67 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
45. Oakes, supra note 40.
46. 541 F.2d at 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
47. Oakes, supra note 40.
48. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975).
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concluded that the effects of the adopted regulations were in fact
discriminatory. It is his examination of effects and his clear recognition of a judicial responsibility to consider substantive issues that
contribute to the landmark character of this decision.
THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE

In previous sections of this article it has been clearly implied that
decisions must be based on evidence, on facts, on logic-all presented
in a record available for examination and perhaps challenge. Due
process in a scientific age could require no less. But two problems
remain for comment, both of which have already been referred to.
The first concerns the location of the burden of proof; the second
concerns the point in the proceedings at which the evidence is presented. Here, I cite no authorities, but simply offer two suggestions
for comment and discussion: 1) a major part (if not all) of the initial
burden of proof should lie with the government in environmental
and land use control cases; 2) all available evidence relevant to the
regulatory policy decision should be introduced as early as possible
in the proceedings and be a matter of record.
The stress on government responsibility for proof is based on a
recognition of the greater fiscal and technical resources available to
government. It is also based on the belief that, in any case, such facts
should have been accumulated as the basis for the challenged decision in the first instance, and thus by applying principles of discovery, such facts should be available to all litigants. In effect, this
argues that due process ("essential fairness") requires preparation of
a kind of impact statement even where NEPA does not apply. The
suggestion that relevant evidence be introduced as early as possible is
designed to permit examination by affected parties and allows for
rebutting evidence and for cross examination.
These are not theoretical proposals, their importance being suggested by an examination of a much-cited Wisconsin land use and
environmental law case-Just v. Marriette County.4 "

Space limita-

tions require a truncated summary of this case that led the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to issue a ringing defense of the environment, ecological relationships, and the prdpriety of constraints on filling in
swamp or wet lands.
The Wisconsin Legislature had enacted a statute establishing a
county-administered program requiring permits for filling swamps or
wet lands. Few would question the general applicability of state
49. Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis.2d, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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police power with respect to the filling of swamps or wet lands, or
the appropriateness of the delegation of responsibility to administer
the permit program to counties. But the very fact that the statute
established a permit system suggests that the Legislature was aware
that not all filling was to be banned, and that in granting or denying
a permit a weighing or balancing process to determine public interests and their relationship to private interests would be involved.
One might, moreover, assume that this process would require evidence-hydrologic, geologic, soils and perhaps benefit-cost data.
The appellants, who sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute,
failed to apply for a permit, whether from ignorance or in order to
challenge the statute is not important. It is at this point where the
problems of evidence first become apparent, for at the trial no evidence was introduced on the adverse impact which might result from
filling approximately three acres of wet land.' 0 A long-time resident,
who was in the real estate business, testified to his impressions regarding the drainage of the tract. No witnesses indicated, however,
that filling would damage ground water, pollute surface water,
change the water regime, or otherwise adversely affect the environment. Whatever information on this subject was presented was not a
matter of record, but reached the Supreme Court via the briefs of the
parties, particularly the brief of the Attorney General as intervenor.
This kind of procedure hardly meets tests of ordinary fairness, let
alone the higher standards of due process and essential fairness one
expects in judicial proceedings. It certainly is arguable that, rather
than writing a much-cited essay on ecological interdependence, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court would have served the public interest better if it had remanded the case to develop a record that would have
shown whether specific damage to the public interest or private individuals would likely result from filling of three acres of swampland.'

1

In environmental and land use cases a factual, scientifically sound
record is important, and establishing the location of the burden of
presenting relevant evidence for that record is vital to restraining
arbitrary power. At no point in the administrative process is the
concern for restraint of arbitrary power more significant than in
connection with land use plans, planning, and regulation. In land use
administration amassing data and information for the wisest possible
50. Since the Justs did not apply fgj a permit, no record was made in connection with
application. The first opportunity to establish a record would have been at the trial itself.
But a careful review of the trial court record transcript indicates that no data on the
scientific facts were introduced.
51. This problem is addressed in WENGERT, supra note 30.
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decisions is critical. Clearly, these problems of evidence and proof
demand attention of legal scholars seeking to analyze, within the
context of fairness and due process, how the best and fullest technical information can be utilized in land use (and environmental)
decisions. The impact assessment approach of NEPA represents a
beginning-but only a beginning. The fears of little people being
pushed around by big government can only be quieted when big
government assumes its proper responsibilities, including that of
using and presenting the best evidence and explaining decisions to
the people involved.

